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THE PERSISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
IN THE STATES
By MONRAD G. PAULSEN*
T IS A commonplace that in the years between 1890 and 1937, the
Supreme Court of the United States declared many state statutes
regulating business and labor unconstitutional as violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Not that the Fourteenth Amendment in
terms says anything which would prohibit state regulation of economic affairs. Yet by a long, gradual process, the words "liberty,"
"property" and "due process" were twisted to permit extensive
limitations on state legislative power. That process is too well
known to require re-telling here.- By giving broad scope to these
vague expressions of the Fourteenth Amendment, the judiciary
seized the power to nullify legislative enactments because the judges
found them vicious or silly. "Liberty" was found to include freedom
to contract and to engage in business. Interference with this freedom was in accordance with "due process" only if the interference
bore, in the eyes of the judges, some relation to public health,
safety or welfare. In sum, for about fifty years the Court operated
on the assumption that the power of legislatures to deal with business affairs was limited by a rule of judicial reason.
Few legal doctrines have been subjected to more bitter criticism
than this testing of regulatory legislation by the due process clause.
Mr. justice Black has termed it "an incongruous excescence on our
Constitution."2 Dean Pound, in discussing due process cases involving some early labor legislation, declared, "The evil of those cases
*A.B. 1940, University of Chicago; J.D. 1942, University of Chicago.
Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law. The author
wishes to express his gratitude to Mr. Philip Z. Leighton, a third year student at Indiana University School of Law, for assistance in research.
1. For the best telling of the history see Hamilton, The Path of Due
Process of Law, The Constitution Reconsidered 167 (Read ed. 1938).
2. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 75 (1947).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
will live after them ....

(Vol. 34:91

I"It has been charged that the doctrine of

substantive due process has been the means whereby conservative
judges have read classical economic theory into the Constitution. 4
The doctrine is seen as a violation of sound democratic procedures
in that it permits judges to substitute their judgment as to political
policy for that of the legislature. 5 Courts presumably are less responsive to the electorate and, in addition, possess neither the tools
for social investigation nor the broad responsibility for developing consistent political and economic policy.
These criticisms have not failed to influence the Supreme
Court in recent years. Although a majority of the Court still
seems to insist that the Court retains some power to pass upon
the substance of state economic regulation under the due process
clause, two judges on the present Court apparently have disavowed
the doctrine. 6 Even the majority of the Court will uphold state
enactments if the facts reveal a basis for legislation which might
7
commend itself to any reasonable man, not merely to the judges.
Taken literally such a test of constitutionality would validate almost
every statute once enough votes were mustered to secure its
passage through the legislature. It is significant that since 1937 the
Court has not declared a statute regulating economic affairs to be
a violation of due process. With two members of the Court willing
to forswear the weapon of due process as against economic regulation, and the rest unwilling to find occasion to use it, the invalidation by reason of the due process clause of state laws seems (for the
moment, at least) to be a matter for history.
In contrast, since 1937 some state supreme courts when interpreting the due process clause or its equivalent in their state constitutions have continued to interfere freely with legislative policies.
3. Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 Yale L. J. 454, 487 (1909).
4. "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's

Social Statics." Holmes, J., dissenting in Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S.
45, 75 (1905).

5. Corwin, Court Over Constitution 107-8 (1938); Cushman, The
Supreme Court and the Constitution, 7 Public Affairs Pamphlet 19 (1938);
Levy, Our Constitution: Tool or Testament 140 (1941).
6. See Mr. Justice Black's concurring opinion in Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575, 599 (1942), with which
Mr. Justice Douglas and the late Mr. Justice Murphy concurred.
7. "A violation of the Fourteenth Amendment... would depend upon
whether there is any rational basis for the action of the legislature" Sage
Stores Co. v. Kansas, 323 U. S.32, 35 (1944). See also Carolene Products
Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 18, 31 (1944). It should be noted that
Justices Black and Douglas concurred in the result in these cases rather than
join in the opinions which upheld the legislation but affirmed by implication
some vestigial doctrine of substantive due process. A student note, 24 Ind. L. J.
451 (1949) reviews the present position of the Court.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

The conviction that legislators cannot be trusted unless they
are kept in harness by courts and lawyers has run deep in American
life. The doctrine of substantive due process was not invented in
1890 by the federal courts.8 Clear traces of the concept can be found
in state court opinions applying state constitutional provisions before the Civil War. Recent research has revealed the role played
by state court opinions, lawyers and text writers in the development of the idea immediately after the Civil WXrar." Therefore, it
is not surprising that just as the doctrine of substantive due process
was finding expression in the states before 1890, so also the principle
should continue to enjoy a vigorous life in some states after it has
fallen into disuse on the national level.
Of course, in interpreting the limitations on legislative action
which are derived from state constitutions, the state supreme court
is the final arbiter. In these matters there is no federal question
and hence no review by the Supreme Court of the United States.
It is the purpose of this paper to show what has occurred in the
state courts rendering substantive due process decisions 0 under
state constitutions since 1937.11 Several matters have been excluded
from consideration: (1) public utility rate cases; (2) cases involving the validity of state taxation; and (3) zoning cases. Opin8. Corwin, Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War,
24 Harv. L. Rev. 366, 460 (1911).
9. Twiss, Lawyers and the Constitution cc. 6, 7 (1942).
10. Throughout this article the phrase "due process" has been used
to refer to clauses in state constitutions which are phrased differently from
the Fourteenth Amendment as well as those which are identical to it.
Some state constitutions contain clauses guaranteeing natural rights, e.g.,
Va. Const. Art. I, § 1. Others forbid the taking of liberty or property save
by "the law of the land," e.g., Mfinn. Const. Art. I, § 2. Still others may
contain the phrase "due course of law," e.g., Ind. Const. Art. I, § 12. Whatever the wording, these clauses and perhaps others like them have placed
unspecified general limitations on legislative power. A state constitution
often contains more than one such clause. Compare Va. Const. Art. I, § 1
("natural rights") with Va. Const. Art. I, § 11 ("due process").
State constitutions also contain clauses prohibiting arbitrary classification in legislation. There is obviously a close relationship between those cases
striking down statutes because they classify unreasonably and those in which
laws are declared unconstitutional simply because they are unreasonable.
Cases involving the constitutionality of ordinances limiting business hours
indicate how either ground can be easily used: Compare Gronlund v. Salt
Lake City, 194 P. 2d 464 (Utah, 1948), with Hart v. Teaneck, 135 N. J.
L. 174, 50 A. 2d 856 (1947) ; City of Cincinnati v. Correll, 141 Ohio 535,
49 N. E. 2d 412 (1943). Nevertheless, in the interest of brevity, the classification cases have not been treated.
11. By no means have all states been active in upsetting legislation on
substantive due process grounds. State cases following the federal trend
have not been discussed except in the section on labor law. An attempt
is made to point up the extent to which substantive due process is still
active in some states rather than to discuss exhaustively the present
status of the constitutional doctrine of substantive due process in all states.
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ions involving statutes regulating the conduct of business enterprise
and legislation attempting to regulate labor have been given greatest
consideration.
PRICE REGULATION

..the right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall

be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself.., and,
as such, within the protection of
the due process clauses of the Fifth
12

and Fourteenth Amendments.
So said Mr. Justice Sutherland in his opinion in the 1926 case
of Tyson & Bro. v. Banton.'2 The learned Justice also insisted that
the validity of any price regulation is "always open to judicial
14
inquiry.'
Using these principles, the pre-New Deal Supreme Court steadfastly denied the existence of a general legislative power to fix
prices. Only if a business were within the closed class of those
"affected with the public interest" might its charges be regulated
by the state. In particular price fixing as to theater tickets,'5 wages,'"
gasoline,' 7 and the rates charged by employment agencies"' was
considered a violation of due process of law. Thus large areas of
American business found constitutional protection from governmental interference with pricing-the heart of the economic process
in a system of private capitalism.
The general and catastrophic price drop of the Great Depression
gave birth to a great many schemes for economic recovery which
involved price stabilization by law. Ruling on these depressionborn statutes, the Supreme Court responded to the economic and
political pressures of the day and sharply changed its position in a
series of cases.
In the Nebbia case of 1934,1' the Court denied that the phrase
"affected with the public interest" referred to a fixed class of
businesses. Rather the expression was said to "mean no more
than that an industry, for adequate reason, is subject to control
for the public good. ' 20 So far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, the power of a state to fix minimum wages has been clear
since the West Coast Hotel case in 1937.21 Finally in 1941 Olsen v.
12. Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 429 (1927).
13. Ibid.
14. Id. at 431.
15. Ibid.
16. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923).
17. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235 (1929).
18. Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 (1928).
19. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
20. Id. at 536.
21. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937).
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Nebraska22 held that a state need no longer make justification to
the Court merely because prices were being regulated. In the Olsen
case, Mr. Justice Douglas summarized the drift of the modern
price fixing cases:
There is no necessity for the state to demonstrate before us that
evils persist despite the competition which attends the bargaining
in this field. In final analysis, the only constitutional prohibitions or
restraints which respondents have suggested for the invalidation of
this legislation are those notions of public policy embedded in earlier
decisions of this Court but which, as Mr. Justice Holmes long
admonished, should not be read into the Constitution.... Since they
do not find expression in the Constitution, we cannot give them
continuing vitality as standards by which the constitutionality 23of
the economic and social programs of the states is to be determined.
But in spite of this trend on the federal level, a few state courts
have persisted in holding that statutes providing for price fixing
by state governmental agencies are unconstitutional. An especially interesting case, Kirtley v. State,24 was decided in 1949 by
the Supreme Court of Indiana. An Indiana statute made it unlawful for any person to sell tickets of admission at a price different
from that at which such tickets might be procured at regularly
authorized place of sale. An enthusiastic follower of Indiana high
school basketball was arrested and convicted of violating the
statute by selling a ticket to the finals of the state basketball tournament for $25.00 instead of the regular $3.00. In securing the reversal of his conviction upon appeal, the basketball fan found that
he had not only made a nice profit on his athletic enthusiasm, but
in realizing the profit he had also exercised his constitutional right,
under the Indiana constitution, to contract freely without state
interference.
The fixing of maximum fees for employment agency services is
beyond legislative power in Nebraska. Although in Boorner v.
Olsen"' the court need only have decided that a given schedule of
fees was unreasonable, its opinion went on to declare that any
schedule fixing fees would violate the state constitution.
A question of more frequent concern to state courts than the
imposition of maximum price ceilings, exemplified by the Kirtley
and Booner cases, is the constitutionality of minimum price regulations. In many states barbers procured the enactment of legisla22.
23.
24.
25.

313 U. S.236 (1941).
Id. at 246-47.
84 N. E. 2d 712 (Ind. 1949).
143 Neb. 579, 10 N. W. 2d 507 (1943).
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tion setting up agencies which would fix minimum charges for
barber shops. Milk producers, too, have been the beneficiaries of
various kinds of price-fixing arrangements. Although the price
fixing of milk has stood the due process test of nearly every jurisdiction,2 6 since 1936, Alabama, 2 7 Indiana,2 Arkansas, 2 Tennessee,"
and Iowal have found price fixing of barber services to be a violation
of constitutional liberties guaranteed by due process clauses.-'
In addition to statutes which permit state agencies to fix the
prices of services or commodities, most states have various statutes
which regulate generally the price policy of business. The so-called
"fair trade acts" permit contracts between a seller of a branded
product and a buyer as to the minimum price to be charged by the
buyer in the resale of the product; and, further, render the
stipulated minimum binding upon any merchant who, with knowledge, offers the same goods for sale in competition with the original buyer. Related "unfair sales" statutes prohibit the sale of commodities below cost and still others forbid individual or geographical discrimination in prices. Other statutes, related in purpose, have
prohibited the giving of discounts or premiums to accomplish the
sale of motor fuel and motor oil below posted prices.
The statutes permitting price fixing of brand-named products
have generally been upheld throughout the United States. Even the
pre-New Deal Supreme Court gave its approval to this kind of
price regulation on the ground that such statutes merely protect
the seller's property right in the "good will" symbolized by the
mark or brand.3 3 However, in the 1949 case of Liquor Store z. Continental Distilling Corp.,3' the Supreme Court of Florida struck down
26. E.g., Holcombe v. Georgia Milk Producers Confederation, 188 Ga.
358, 3 S. E. 2d 705 (1939) ; State v. Auclair, 110 Vt. 147, 4 A. 2d 107 (1939).
27. City of Mobile v. Rouse, 233 Ala. 622, 173 So. 266 (1937).
28. State Bd. of Barber Examiners v. Cloud, 220 Ind. 552, 44 N. E. 2d
972 (1942).
29. Noble v. Davis, 204 Ark. 156, 161 S. W. 2d 189 (1942).
30. State v. Greeson, 174 Tenn. 178, 124 S. W. 2d 253 (1939).
31. Duncan v. City of Des Moines, 222 Lowa 218, 268 N. W. 547 (1936).
32. Price fixing of barbers' services has been upheld in several states:
Bd. of Barber Examiners v. Parker, 190 La. 214, 182 So. 485 (1938);
Herrin v. Arnold, 183 Okla. 392, 82 P. 2d 977 (1938) ; State v. McMasters,
204 Minn. 438, 283 N. W. 767 (1939) ; Arnold v. Bd. of Barber Examiners,
45 N. Mex. 57, 109 P. 2d 779 (1941). It should also be noted that in two
jurisdictions the power to fix minimum charges for cleaning and dyeing service has been upheld. Miami Laundry v. Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry
Bd., 134 Fla. 1, 183 So. 759 (1938) ; Smith Cleaners v. Rogers, 108 Colo.
449, 119 P. 2d 623 (1941).
33. Old Dearborn Co. v. Seagram Corp., 299 U. S. 183 (1936).
34. 40 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1949)..-Three concurring and one dissenting
opinions were written in the case. The opinion of the court held the act unconstitutional because it operated for private -rather than public benefit
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the Florida "fair trade act" with only one judge dissenting. Again in
contrast with many of the decided cases, 35 Maryland, 36 Nebraska,37
New Jersey,35 Ohio,-

Oklahoma, 40 and Pennsylvania 41 have de-

clared statutes which prohibit certain sales below cost to be unconstitutional while Michigan4 2- has invalidated a statute prohibiting
discrimination in selling. The Alabama,4 3 Massachusetts, 44 and
Michigan4 courts upset the statutes regulating the price policy of
filling stations.
One concurring opinion would invalidate the act because of an unconstitu-

tional classification; the others because no emergency existed and also be-

cause the law contained no yardstick with reference to which prices could
be fixed. The Florida legislature immediately enacted a new Fair Trade

Act in an attempt to meet constitutional objectives. Senate Bill No. 592,

Fla. Laws 1949. The constitutionality of the new legislation is discussed
in Note, 2 U. of Fla. Rev. 408 (1949).
35. People v. Pay Less Drug Store, 25 Cal. 2d 108, 153 P. 2d 9 (1944);
McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 292 N. W. 414 (1940); Associated
Merchants v. Ormesher, 107 Mont. 530, 86 P. 2d 1031 (1939); State v.
Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P. 2d 767 (1938).
36. Loughran v. Lord Baltimore Candy & Tobacco Co. 178 Md. 38, 12 A.
2d 201 (1940). A new Maryland statute is now found in Md. Code Anno.,
tit. 83, §§ 111-115 (1939).
37. State v. Ruback, 135 Neb. 335, 281 N. W. 607 (1938). A new
Nebraska unfair sales statute has been passed and found constitutional in
Hill z.Kusey, 150 Neb. 653, 35 N. W. 2d 594 (1949).
38. State v. Packard-Bamberger & Co., 123 N. J. L. 180, 8 A. 2d
291 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
39. Serrer v. Cigarette Service Co., 148 Ohio 519, 76 N. E. 2d 91
(1947). Another statute similar to the first, has been passed in Ohio.
H. B. No. 101, Ohio Laws 1949.
40. Englebrecht v. Day, 208 P. 2d 538 (Okla. 1949). The Oklahoma
legislature passed a new statute immediately. H. B. No. 488, Okla. Laws
1949.
41. Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 547, 13 A. 2d 67 (1940).
42. People v. Chas. E. Austin, Inc., 301 Mich. 456, 3 N. W. 2d 841
(1942).
43. Alabama Independent Service Station Ass'n v. McDowell, 242
Ala. 424, 6 So. 2d 502 (1942).
Price competition 'is discouraged by some statutes which prohibit the
advertising of prices. Connecticut and New Jersey courts have struck
down statutes forbidding the large roadside advertisements of motor fuel.
State v. Miller, 126 Conn. 373, 12 A. 2d 192 (1940) ; Regal Oil Co. v.
State, 123 N. J. L. 456, 10 A. 2d 495 (Sup. Ct. 1939). Merit Oil Co. v.
Director of Division of Necessaries of Life, 319 Mass. 301, 65 N. E. 2d
529 (1946) is contra. An Indiana statute forbidding funeral directors to
advertise their prices has been invalidated, Needham v. Proffit, 220 Ind.
265, 41 N. E. 2d 606 (1942). There has been considerable controversy as to
whether advertising the price of spectacles may be prohibited. Compare
Ritholz v. City of Detroit, 308 Mich. 258, 13 N. W. 2d 283 (1944) with
Ritholz v. Com., 184 Va. 339, 35 S.E. 2d 210 (1945).
44. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. McBride, 307 Mass. 408, 30 N. E. 2d
269 (1940).
45. People v. Victor, 287 Mich. 506, 283 N. W. 666 (1939). The
Michigan statute applied to the sale of bakery products as well as petroleum.
46. 40 So. 2d 371, 375 (Fla. 1949). The Supreme Court of Minnesota
has expressly rejected any distinction between state and federal due process.
"The due process clause of our state constitution is not more restrictive
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In declaring price-fixing statutes unconstitutional, state supreme
courts have in some cases sought to distinguish recent United
States Supreme Court cases and have proceeded to hold statutes
unconstitutional as violating both the federal and state due process
provisions. But in more recent years, state supreme courts have
relied solely upon their own state constitutions. For example in the
Continental Distilling case Judge Adams of Florida announced:
The court of last resort of each sovereign state is the final arbiter
as to whether the act conforms to its own constitution whereas the
federal courts are concerned
only with whether the act offends the
46
Federal Constitution.

In Nebraska, the freedom of state courts from federal due
process development has been recognized in an even more striking
way. The Nebraska court in Boorner v. Olsen dealing with the
same statute which had been tested by the Supreme Court in
Olsen v. Nebraska refers to that federal case, but declines to
follow it, saying:
While it is true that the supreme court of the United States has
receded from this position in the later cases in interpreting the
provisions of the federal Constitution, this court has consistently
adhered to the doctrine, except in a business in which the owner
by devoting it to a public use, in effect, grants the public an interest
in the use and subjects himself to public regulation to the extent of
that interest....
We . .. hold that a private employment agency is not a business

in which the public has such an interest that price fixing may properly be included 4as
a method of regulation under the provisions of
7
our Constitution.

When a state court has thus freed itself from the modern federal
cases, there remains for it the problem of defining the content of
state due process. Some authority must be found to give meaning to
generality. The courts have drawn upon state cases and upon prethan the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal
constitution." Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 32 N. W. 2d 538

(1948).

47. 143 Neb. 579, 585-86, 10 N. W. 2d 507, 511-12 (1943). See also
Dept. of Insurance v. Schoonover, 225 Ind. 187, 194, 72 N. E. 2d 747, 750
(1947):
"We have not found a decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States where a similar state regulation has been upheld in the light of the
14th Amendment, but had there been such a decision this court would not
be bound by the same when considering the involved statute as to whether it is
in conflict with said Art. 1, § 1, of our Constitution although this section
and the 14th Amendment are similar in meaning and application. Such a
decision would only be persuasive." See Kirtley v. State, 84 N. E. 2d 712,
715 (Ind. 1949).
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New Deal Supreme Court cases. Thus the Indiana court in 194948
cited Ribnik v. McBride49 although that case was overruled by
Olsen v. Nebraska;5o in 1942 the Alabama court5 ' used Williams v.
Standard Oil"2 as though the Nebbia case had never been decided;
53
was largely filled with quotations
and in 1939, a Tennessee opinion
4
York.5
New
v.
from Lochner
Upon such authority as this price regulation statutes have been
held to violate due process clauses for three principal reasons: (a)
the statute as it was drawn put unduly harsh burdens upon the
persons subject to regulation ;" (b) the statute was too vague in
setting forth the standards of conduct required ;56 or (c) the statute
imposed restraints on liberty which are unreasonable because they
serve a private rather than a public purpose. 57
If a statute is unconstitutional because of harshness resulting
from inadequate draftsmanship or because of failure to be sufficiently precise, a legislature can and frequently does make another attempt at draftsmanship. But the courts permanently block
certain types of legislative effort to solve economic and social
problems when they forbid legislation in the whole area of price
regulation.
The Indiana and Florida Courts, in attacking price-fixing legislation, have responded to the uncompromising conviction that price
fixing itself is a violation of the personal rights of an individual and
is justified only if the courts believe the public welfare is served
by the restraint on liberty. Mr. Justice Sutherland himself might
48. Kirtleyv. State, 84 N. E. 2d 712 (Ind. 1949).
49. 277 U. S. 350 (1928).
50. 313 U.S.236 (1941).
51. Alabama Independent Service Station Ass'n v. McDowell, 242
Ala. 424, 6 So. 2d 502 (1942).

52.
53.
54.
55.

(1947).

278 U. S. 235 (1929).
State v. Greeson, 174 Tenn. 178, 124 S. W. 2d 253 (1939).
198 U. S. 45 (1905).
Serrer v. Cigarette Service Co., 148 Ohio 519, 76 N. E. 2d 91

56. State v. Packard-Bamberger & Co., 123 N. J. L. 180, 8 A. 2d
291 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ; People v. Chas. E. Austin Inc., 301 Mich. 456, 3 N. W.
2d 841 (1942); State v. Ruback, 135 Neb. 335, 281 N. W. 607 (1938);
Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A. 2d 67 (1940). Cf. Illinois
Liquor Control Com. v. Chicago's Last Liquor Store, 88 N. E. 2d 15 (Ill.
1949). A full discussion of the modern void for vagueness problem appears
ina Note,23 Ind.L. J.272 (1948).

57. Alabama Independent Serv. Station Ass'n v. McDowell, 242 Ala.

424, 6 So. 2d 502 (1942); Liquor Store v. Continental Distilling Corp.,

40 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1949); Kirtley v. State, 84 N. E. 2d 712 (Ind. 1949) ;
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. McBride, 307 Mass. 408, 30 N. E. 2d 269
(1940) ; People v. Victor, 287 Mich. 506, 283 N. W. 666 (1939) ; Boomer
v. Olsen, 143 Neb. 579, 10 N. W. 2d 507 (1943).
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well have written these sentences from the Kirtley case:
Liberty . . . embraces the right of every one to be free in the use
of their powers in the pursuit of happiness in such calling as they
may choose subject only to the restraints necessary to secure the
common welfare. The privilege of contracting is both a liberty and a
property right and is protected by the constitution of both the
state and nation."
or these from the ContinentalDistilling case,

The right to own, hold and enjoy property is nearly absolute.
The statute cannot be the means of leveling unequal fortunes,
neither can it favor one segment of the people at the expense of
another. These principles are fundamental.5 9
With such language the "old Supreme Court" would be quite
at home. In some courts, the good old days still live.
CONTROL OF COMPETITION BY LICENSING
Historically, there seems to have been very little controversy

about the general power of a state or a properly empowered municipal corporation to license any business or occupation in the community. ° However, there has been considerable debate over the
constitutionality of particular licensing statutes and ordinances
when they have been used to restrict competition or to place rather
harsh burdens upon the licensee.
The Old Court insisted that the requirements for licensing bear
some reasonable relationship to the Court's conception of the
general welfare. Devoted as it was to principles of classical economics, the Court was convinced that the general welfare could
never be advanced by a statute which favored the competitive advantage of one group at the expense of another. This conviction
was clearly the heart of the matter in New State Ice Company v.
Liebmann.61 There, in 1932, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a statute which required the obtaining of a certificate
58. 84 N. E. 2d 712, 714 (Ind. 1949).
59. 40 So. 2d 371, 374 (Fla. 1949). See also Boomer v. Olsen, 143 Neb.
579, 585-86, 10 N. W. 2d 507, 511-12 (1943) : "[the statute) has the further
effect of substituting human judgment for the market place, and the judgment of individuals has never proved to be an adequate substitute for supply
and demand. The right to deal with one's property by barter and trade is
thereby seriously infringed. . . . The stifling of a legitimate occupational
pursuit by legislative price fixing has been condemned as unconstitutional
by this court as being beyond the realm of a regulatory statute.... We find no
reason for receding from this position."
60. On licensing generally see Silverman, Bennett, and Lechliter,
Control by Licensing Over Entry Into the Market, 8 Law & Contemp. Prob.
234 (1941).
61. 285 U. S. 262 (1932).
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of public convenience and necessity before persons could engage
in the manufacture or in the distribution of ice in the state of
Oklahoma. Certificates were to be issued only upon a showing
that additional facilities were needed in the community where a
proposed ice business was to be set up. Mr. Justice Sutherland
declared that to interfere thus with an ordinary employment was
to create and foster monopoly against the interests of the consuming
public. In his opinion the case involved:
•

. .

a private corporation . . . [which] seeks to

prevent a com-

petitor from entering the business of making and selling ice. It
claims to be endowed with state authority to achieve this exclusion."He saw no difference between imposing this kind of licensing requirement upon ice manufacturers and imposing it upon any other
occupation such as shoe-making, dairying or the renting of houses.
Obviously, the latter pursuits could be followed (as a matter of
constitutional right) without a license the purpose of which was
to exclude competition for private benefit. just as a state could not
fix the prices charged by a business not affected with a public
interest, so also these ordinary businesses could not be required
to obtain certificates of convenience and necessity.
For some reason the Supreme Court has never openly repudiated the Liebmann case although the decision clearly rests upon
two old-fashioned constitutional doctrines: (1) "Businesses affected
with the public interest" are a closed class of enterprises-the socalled "natural monopolies." (2) A state may not pursue economic
policies which differ sharply from the policies supposedly required
by laisse-faire theory. The "fixed class" conception is no longer
tenable after the re-definition of the phrase in the Nebbia case.
Also in the Nebbia case the freedom of a state to choose among
economic policies was forcefully stated:
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the
absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt
whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote
public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted
to its purpose.0 3
Yet today the viewpoint of seemingly authoritative Liebmann
is as vigorously alive in the states as many of its expressly overruled cousins. The 1948 Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinion of
62. Id. at 278.
63. 291 U. S. 502, 537 (1934).
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Hertz Drivurself Station v. Siggins6" was cut from the same cloth
as the Liebmann case.
In 1943, the legislature of Pennsylvania sought to give the
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission power to require public
convenience and necessity certificates of motor vehicle lessors.
Ordinarily when a state chooses to impose this requirement on a
"common carrier" there is little serious constitutional question.65
But in recent years a new phenomenon has developed. In many
places companies now stand ready to lease motor vehicles without
drivers either to individuals or commercial establishments. It is
these companies which were to be regulated by the Pennsylvania
statute.
The Pennsylvania Court held that the business of leasing motor
vehicles was not affected with the public interest and hence a
certificate could not be required. Furthermore the licensing provision was not designed to protect the public welfare. Neither the
power of the state to regulate its highways nor its power to control
those enterprises competing with regulated carriers provided a
sufficient basis for the statute.
The phrase "affected with a public interest" was given a definition based upon Mr. Chief Justice Taft's discussion in Wolf Packing Co. v. Court of IndustrialRelations :6
• . . private property used in the enjoyment of a monoply
(either governmentally or circumstantially created) for the rendition of a needed and useful service to the public is subject, as a
legally necessary concomitant, to legislative regulation and control ....67

The Drivurself Company selected its customers; therefore the
64. 359 Pa. 25, 58, A. 2d 464 (1948) ; cf. North Little Rock Transp.
Co. v. City of No. Little Rock, 207 Ark. 976, 184 S. W. 2d 52 (1944).
There the Arkansas Supreme Court held a statute unconstitutional which
would permit presently licensed taxicab drivers to provide additional
service when the need for such service had been established by a city council finding made in response to a new application for a cab permit. In the
court's judgment, the act was not a proper exercise of the police power and
therefore violated Arkansas' constitutional prohibition against monopolies.
See also State v. Moore, 91 N. H. 16, 13 A. 2d 143 (1940).
65. See Hall, State Control of Business Through Certificates of Con-

venience and Necessity (Bureau of Gov't Research, Dep't of Gov't, Indiana

Univ. 1948), esp. pp. 15-21.
66. 262 U. S. 522 (1923).
67. 359 Pa. 25, 37, 58 A. 2d 464, 471 (1948). (Italics are the court's).
The Pennsylvania court has also been active in striking down legislation
on due process grounds in areas other than that of business regulation. See
Wilcox v. Penm Mutual Life Ins. Co., 357 Pa. 581, 55 A. 2d 521 (1947), in
which the Pennsylvania community property law was declared unconstitutional as a violation of due process.
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public had no right to expect the leasing service to be available
to anyone demanding it-another characteristic of the class "affected with a public interest."
The judges were greatly concerned that the real purpose of
the legislation was to benefit Driveurself's competitors and not the
public. The company was required to file a schedule of rates which
were not to be lower than the rates charged by common carriers.
A statement in an intervenor's brief of a Yellow Cab Company
subsidiary provided the final proof of the private benefit served by
the statute:
".... Yellow Rental caused a bill to be prepared and introduced
into the legislature which, after some amendments, was enacted. It
was signed by the Governor on June 5, 1943." And, that is the Act
now before us.6s
Entrance into a business or occupation may be restricted in
many other ways than requiring a showing of community need
before a public agency. If those who wish to enter some area of the
business world are required to demonstrate a certain degree of
technical proficiency or moral fiber some prospective competitors
will never actually set up shop. This device for limiting competitors
is especially attractive because a real public interest can be honestly
urged in most cases. If work is well done there is some benefit
to all and there are tricks to learn in every trade. Enviously eyeing
the long-standing educational and technical prerequisites for
lawyers, doctors, dentists and the like, persons in other fields have
sometimes attempted to procure the enactment of statutes which
similarly would set up standards to be met by newcomers.
Here we meet the barbers again. In most states, barbers are
licensed and qualifications of training or experience must be shown
before a license will be issued. The requirement of a semi-professional training has met with court approval in almost every instance.6 1 Courts have been impressed by the close relationship between the haircut and the transmission of disease. This is in contrast
to the mixed reception given legislation fixing the prices of barbers'
services. It is apparently assumed that a trained though impoverished barber will nevertheless be clean.
In addition to the regulation of barbering, several states have
set up boards to license other service vocations such as the practice
of professional photography or dry cleaning. Typically, the statutes
68. Id. at 50, 58 A. 2d at 478. (Italics are the court's.)
69. See the cases cited by Silverman, Bennett and Lechliter, supra
note 60, at 238 n. 16.
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setting up the boards provide for the issuance of a license only after
the payment of a modest fee, the passing of an examination and a
showing as to the applicant's business integrity. Without a license,
to provide the service for compensation is a misdemeanor.
The photography statutes have been tested and declared unconstitutional in seven jurisdictions ;10 and in North Carolina the
statute licensing dry cleaners has been invalidated,' In reaching
these decisions, the courts have viewed professional photography
and the dry cleaning business as harmless, ordinary callings in
which all men are free to engage. No perceivable connection is seen
between the public health or welfare and the imposed restrictions.
As to photography in particular, the pleasure which many receive
from it as a hobby is emphasized to show the unreasonableness of
requiring mental and moral examinations before engaging in the
pursuit for hire.
Here, as in the price fixing cases, the state courts have either
distinguished federal cases such as Nebbia and Olsen z. Nebraska
or declined to find them definitive of state due process. Even if, by
distinguishing the Supreme Court cases, a state court finds the
statute to violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the decisions nevertheless have been carefully grounded upon provisions of the state
as well as the Federal Constitution, leaving no possibility of a
United States Supreme Court reversal.
In these cases the economic and political philosophy of the
judges becomes quite easy to read and has plainly influenced the
results. Sometimes judicial faith in the ideals of individualism
shines forth in the course of an opinion:
Resort to the police power to exclude persons from an ordinary
calling, finding justification only by the existence of a vague public
interest, often amounting to no more than a doubtful social convenience, is collectivistic in principle, destructive to the historic
values of these guaranties, and contrary to the genius of the people
who did all that was humanly possible to secure them in a written
constitution. . . . A departure from these standards may be re70. Buebman v. Bechtel, 57 Ariz. 363, 114 P. 2d 227 (1941) ; Sullivan
v. De Cerb, 156 Fla. 496, 23 So. 2d 571 (1945) ; Bramley v. State, 187 Go.
826, 2 S. E. 2d 647 (1939) ; State v. Cromwell, 72 N. D. 565, 9 N. XV. 2d
914 (1943); State v. Ballance, 51 S. E. 2d 731 (N.C. 1949) ; foore v.
Sutton, 185 Va. 481, 39 S. E. 2d 348 (1946) ; cf. Wright v. Wiles, 173 Tenn.
334, 117 S. W. 2d 736 (1938).
71. State v. Harris, 216 N. C. 746, 6 S. E. 2d 854 (1940). Note, 27
N. C. L. Rev. 532 (1949) shows a correspondence between legislative and
judicial attitudes in regard to this type of licensing statute in North Carolina. While the Supreme Court of North Carolina has decided the Harris
case and State v. Ballance, supra note 70, the legislature has generally refused to enact new statutes of a similar sort.
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garded as social retrogression. No good can come to society from
a policy which tends to drive its members from the ranks of the
independently employed into the ranks of those industrially dependent, and the economic fallacy of such a policy is too obvious
for comment."
In the Virginia photographer's case, the court strikes out against
the advance of bureaucracy:
In this day of bureaucracies multiplied we are constrained to emphasize the virtue of a firm adherence to the philosophy that that
state is best governed which is least governed. 3
The dislike of protecting special groups from the rigors of competition is an attitude which runs through all the opinions. Again
and again there is insistence that the real purpose of the legislation
is to protect private rather than public interest. Monopoly with
legislative sanction is the evil which these courts would avoid. The
legislature alone cannot hold back the forces of concentrated
minorities:
What we have said regarding the statute is, of course, no reflection upon the legislature which enacted it. Beyond question
the legislative motive and purpose were good. But it is a matter
of common knowledge that pressure groups are frequently able
to bring about legislative action they believe will be to their advantage by7 4their argument that it is needed for the protection of
the public.
To exclude persons from the opportunity of earning a living not
only creates the danger of their being made public charges but also
deprives them of fundamental human rights:
. . . the right to earn a living must be regarded as inalienable.
Conceding this, a lav which destroys the opportunity of a man or
woman to earn a living in one of the ordinary harmless occupations
of life by the erection of educational and moral standards of fitness
is legal grotesquery.7 5
To all this is added the fear of advancing in the direction toward
which this type of licensing regulation is supposed to lead. If photographers and dry cleaners can set semi-professional standards so
can any other business group. The process can only end with the
72. Id. at 763, 6 S. E. 2d at 865.
73. Moore v. Sutton, 185 Va. 481, 490, 39 S. E. 2d 348, 352 (1946).
74. State v. Cromwell, 72 N. D. 565, 580, 9 N. W. 2d 914, 921-22
(1943).
75. State v. Harris, 216 N. C. 746, 759, 6 S. E. 2d 854, 863 (1940). The
North Carolina court has felt free to redraft a statute if necessary in order
to avoid the placing of licensing requirements upon a group which that court
feels cannot be licensed under proper exercise of the police power. See Palmer
v. Smith, 229 N. C. 618, 51 S. E. 2d 8 (1948).
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whole economic community organized after the manner of the
medieval guilds or the corporate state:
Statutes regulating trades and occupations by the delegation of
governmental power to boards and commissions formed largely
of the groups affected, intended primarily to control the personnel
of the business, have become so common as to affect progressively
and importantly the social and economic life of the State .... The
stage of internal protest has been reached .... Without the aid of

the statute these groups would be mere trade guilds, or voluntary
business associations; with it they become State agencies, retaining,
however, as far as possible, distinctive guild features.70
The offering of services for hire may be made subject to mental
or moral qualifications by the device of requiring that the services
may be provided hereafter only by an already licensed group. This
device may not meet with judicial approval even if the activity is
placed within the province of an established profession, the power
to license which is indisputable. Recently the Mississippi Supreme
Court 77 upset a statute which limited to lawyers and certified public

accountants the practice of making out tax returns for compensation. The legislature was without power to give a monopoly of
such business. To choose those who will make out one's tax return
is a "right of the citizens of this State.

78

1

Undoubtedly the Court

was influenced as well by what it saw to be a local problem in
Mississippi: "there are scores and scores of small communities
without any Certified Public Accountants" 7 and it was "well known
that not enough members of the legal profession are willing to
assist with small Income Tax Returns."8
Licensing may sharply restrict economic rivalry if the acquisition of a license is costly either in the price of the license itself or in
the expenditure necessary to qualify for its issuance or retention.
In many cases large licensing fees have been imposed for the
principal purpose of discouraging certain kinds of business for the
benefit of competitors. An example is the heavy license fees which
many states exact from those who deal in oleomargarine. Within
76. Id. at 751-52, 6 S. E. 2d at 858-59. The Harris case has been drawn

upon so freely because of its importance as authority in the photography
cases after 1940.
Many licensing or price fixing statutes involve delegation of power to
private groups, thereby raising serious constitutional problems. See La
Forge v. Ellis, 175 Ore. 545, 154 P. 2d 844 (1945) ; Revne v. Trade Commission, 192 P. 2d 563 (Utah 1948).
77. Moore v. Grillis, 39 So. 2d 505 (Miss. 1949).
78. Id. at 509.
79. Id. at 508.

80. Id. at 511.
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two victories by successfully attacking state license-tax legislation
the past four years the proponents of oleomargarine have scored
in Pennsylvania 8l and MontanaO2 under the respective due process
provisions of those state constitutions. Under the Pennsylvania
act licenses to manufacture oleo cost $1,000 per year; wholesalers
were charged $500 annually and retailers $100. In Montana the
licenses were $1,000 and $400 per year for wholesalers and retailers
respectively.
Both courts rejected the argument that the license fee was
merely revenue raising. The Pennsylvania court pointed to the
title of the statute which announced it was an "act ... to regulate
the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine. . . ." Montana's Judge
Adair was impressed with the fact that 92%o of the state's grocery
stores were unable to sell the butter-substitute because the license
was so expensive. A disproportion between the amount of the fee
and the cost of proper police regulation was seen in both situations.
The statutes setting up the licensing scheme were clearly regulations
of business rather than taxing acts.
As regulations which tended toward suppression of the sale
of oleo the statutes were termed unreasonable and oppressive. The
economic advantages of dairy farmers might not be advanced at the
expense of another legitimate business:
Obviously the legislature was and is without power to prohibit
a legitimate business or to create a monopoly in favor of one branch
of industry handling food products and against another branch of
industry handling equally wholesome articles of food. 83
The particular statutes involved in these cases had been on the
books for a long time. The Pennsylvania act was passed in 1901
and the Montana statute in 1929. The age of the enactment was
urged as a reason to sustain them, but this argument was expressly
brushed aside. There is no statute of limitation which runs against
the exercise of a judge's will to invalidate legislation.
Onerous burdens other than high fees as conditions of obtaining
or keeping a license to engage in business are shown in two New
81. Flynn v. Horst, 356 Pa. 20, 51 A. 2d 54 (1947) ; cf. People ex rel.
Barrett v. Thillens, 400 I1. 224, 79 N. E. 2d 609 (1948).
82. Brackman v. Kruse, 199 P. 2d 971 (Mont. 1948). A fifteen cents
per pound tax levied on oleo by the state of Washington was upheld by the
Old Court. Magnano v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40 (1934). The Wyoming
Supreme Court has recently followed the Magnano case: Ludwig v. Harston,
197 P. 2d 252 (Wyo. 1948).
83. 199 P. 2d 971, 978. Even if the license fee is rather modest licensing
may violate a state constitution if the purpose of the license is shown to be
protection of a "private" rather than a "public" interest. Kresge Co. v.
Couzens, 290 Mich. 185, 287 N. W. 427 (1939).
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Jersey cases. New Jersey attempted to discourage the operation of
used car lots by granting licenses only to those who did business in
a place not less than 1,000 square feet in area-that is, to those
who supposedly were substantial businessmen. The licensee was
also required to provide facilities for complete motor vehicle
servicing. The statute was invalidated by the New Jersey Superior
Court 4 because the Court saw no real public interest at stake in
the regulation which would justify the interference with the right
to engage in lawful business. In part the Court relied on the
Supreme Court opinion in the Liebmann case.
In the other New Jersey case the practice of denistry with
the use of leased equipment was made a statutory ground for
suspending a dentist's license to practice. Observing that a dentist's
skill has nothing to do with his ability to buy equipment, the
New Jersey Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional as
an arbitrary encroachment on individual liberty.85
Occasionally a legislature will deny business licenses to a
group by flat prohibit without regard to the public necessity for
the enterprise or the qualifications of the applicant. An Indiana
licensing statute attempted to better the competitive position of
the independent insurance salesmen by this method. Fire and
casualty insurance agents were to be licensed only if they sold on
a commission basis. Salesmen who were paid a salary would no
longer be able to sell policies. Holding the act unconstitutional
without extended discussion, 0 Indiana's Supreme Court Judge
Starr said: "Whether an insurance agent is paid a salary or commission has nothing to do with the public welfare ... .s7 His opinion
shows not only how readily the Indiana Court will upset a
statute which it judges unreasonable but also how that Court apparently will deprive itself of the facts with which to make the
judgment:
• . . extrinsic evidence will not be received on the constitutionality of such statute. The only extrinsic facts which will be considered are those of which the court will take judicial notice.,
Certainly there will be many facts not subject to judicial notice
84. New Jersey Used Car Trade Ass'n v. Magee, 1 N. J.Misc. 371,
61 A. 2d 751 (Super. Ct. 1948).
85. Taber v. State Board of Registration and Examination in Dentistry
of New Jersey, 135 N. J. L. 255, 51 A. 2d 250 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
86. Department of Insurance v. Schoonover, 225 Ind. 187, 72 N. E.
2d 747 (1947).
87. Id. at:193,72 N. E. 2d at 750.
88. Id. at 190, 72 N. E. 2d at 748.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

which are relevant to the issue of whether a given statute is
reasonable. Absent such facts the judicial constitutional method
must be "to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked
beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the
latter squares with the former."8
PROHIBITION OF BUSINESS METHODS

The great majority of the cases in the sections above have
dealt with statutes designed to meet the economic problems of the
business area sought to be regulated. Restrictions may of course
be put on an enterprise to deal with a great many other matters
which fall within an orthodox definition of the police power. Because the power of the legislature is usually admitted in these
cases, the statutes are unconstitutional only because the courts
find the statutes not reasonably related to the end sought. In
no group of cases does the substitution of judicial for legislative
judgment stand out more clearly.
Typical of the pre-New Deal Court's willingness to secondguess the legislature is the case of Adams v. Tanner." The state
of Washington had by initiative prohibited the operation of private
employment agencies, a business in which fraudulent practices
were common. The opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice McReynolds
in this 1917 case contained language which has been relied upon
in the states deciding cases under their own constitutions:
Because abuses may ,and probably do,, grow up in connection
with this business, is adequate reason for hedging it about by
proper regulations. But this is not enough to justify destruction
of one's right to follow a distinctly useful calling in an up-right
way. Certainly there is no profession, possibly no business, which
does not offer peculiar opportunities for reprehensible practices;
and as to every one of them, no doubt, some can be found quite
ready earnestly to maintain that its suppression would be in the
public interest."1

This judicial attitude is quite different from the present one of
the Court, as shown by the late Mr. Justice Murphy's opinion in
92
the 1949 case of Daniel v. Family Security Life Insurance Co.
89. Roberts, J., in United States v. Butler, 297 U. S.1, 62 (1936).
Chief Justice Gilkison of Indiana has paraphrased this very dictum. "In the

consideration of this case we . . . shall consider only the statute upon

which the charge is founded, and the sections of the state constitution with
which itis claimed to be in conflict." Kirtley v. State, 84 N. E. 2d 712,
714 (Ind. 1949).
.90. 244 U. S. 590 (1917).
91. Id. at 594.
92. 336 U. S.220 (1949).
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After briefly reviewing the background of a South Carolina statute,
the Justice said:
The forum for the correction of ill-considered legislation is a
responsive legislature.
We cannot say that South Carolina is not entitled to call the
funeral insurance business an evil. Nor can we say that the statute
has no relation to the elimination of those evils. There our inquiry must stop. 93
Two courts, the New York Court of Appeals9 4 and the New
Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals,95' have invalidated city ordinances on the ground expressed in Adams v. Tanner. The cases
both involved a prohibition of selling ice cream bars and similar
products from carts or wagons on the city streets. Despite the
traffic hazard which such selling may create, both courts were
persuaded the other regulations less drastic than prohibition could
be adopted to accomplish any protection necessary to the public
welfare. This point of view has also prevailed in three Ohio inferior
court§ in other "Good Humor" cases.96 The legislature may deal
with the traffic problems in these states only by more reasonable
means.
The legislative judgment that the public interest in protection against fraud or over-reaching business tactics requires some
legislative enactment, may also be judicially challenged. Again, the
courts in some states make an independent judgment whether the
statute is related to the end sought.
To do two kinds of business in close conjunction may provide
easy opportunity for over-reaching. On this ground the Massachusetts General Court sought to forbid cemetary corporations
from selling memorial monuments. While this type of regulation is
a great deal less drastic than complete prohibition of monument
93. Id. at 224.
94. Good Humor Corp. v. City of New York, 290 N. Y. 312, 49 N. E.

2d 153 (1943). The opinions passing on these "Good Humor" ordinances
are difficult to classify in that an ordinance may be invalid either because
it is unconstitutional or because it is unreasonable and hence beyond the
powers conferred by statute upon the municipal corporation. Cases are

seldom precise as to the ground chosen. However, the approach of the
courts in substituting judicial for legislative judgment is identical in either
event.
95. New Jersey Good Humor v. Board of Bradley Beach, 124 N. J. L.
162, 11 A. 2d 113 (Ct. of Err. and App., 1940).

96. Frecker v. City of Dayton, 85 N. E. 2d 419 (Ct. of App., Ohio,
1949); Schul v. King, 70 N. E. 2d 378 (Ct. of Com. Pleas, Ohio, 1946);
Frecker v. City of Zanesville, 72 N. E. 2d 477 (Ct. of Com. Pleas, Ohio,
1946). A so-called confiscatory tax on ice-cream dealers was held unconstitutional in Martin v. Nocero Ice Cream Co., 269 Ky. 151, 106 S. W.
2d 64 (1937).
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selling, yet it seemed unreasonable to the Massachusetts Judicial
Court. Consequently the Massachusetts legislature was advised
by the Justices0 17 that the statute would deprive the cemetary corporation of constitutional rights. Hence the right to sell monuments
either solely or in connection with another enterprise is a right
guaranteed by the Massachusetts Constitution. It is "fanciful rather
than real" to suggest "that a bereaved family seeking a place to
bury their dead might possibly be exposed to undesirable importunity in the matter of purchase of a monument or might be
discriminated against for refusal to buy. . ..."
To protect against oppressive credit arrangements through the
regulation of financial institutions is clearly within the competence
of state legislatures. Yet when the Small Loans Act of Illinois
prohibited a loan company from pledging notes given by borrowers
to anyone except banks authorized to do business in Illinois, an
Illinois trust company successfully contended that to exclude other
types of lenders from the business was an unreasonable exercise of
legislative power."" While banks are much more extensively supervised than trust companies in Illinois, it was the Court's judgment
that:
If, as appellants contend, it was the intention of the General Assembly to limit the pledge or hypothecation of such paper to institutions subject to examination and control of a department of the
State, this purpose affords no reasonable basis for discrimination
against trust companies, for, as we have seen, they are likewise
under such control of the State.'
Burial insurance companies have been guilty of a great many
abusive practices. The principal danger lies in a close tie-up between the insurance company and undertakers. When the policies
call for the use of a given undertaker, he has a monopoly position
which may be exploited in poor service, high prices or both. Although the legislature of Kentucky has attempted to strike at the
methods of these companies, it has had no success because of interference by the courts.
In 1932, it was made unlawful for any burial association to
97. Opinion of the Justices, 322 Mass. 755, 79 N. E. 2d 883 (1948).
98. Id. at 761, 79 N. E. 2d at 887.
99. Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Jones, 384 Ill. 248, 51 N. E. 2d 256

(1943).
100. Id. at 256, 51 N. E. 2d at 260. The close link between due process

and constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable classification is seen in
the Metropolitan Trust case. "A law which deprives one class of persons
of the right to acquire and enjoy property, or to contract with relation
thereto, in the same manner as others under like conditions . . . is not

comprehended within the true meaning or the words 'due process of law.' ..."
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issue a certificate providing for the payment of benefits in merchandise or services. The Supreme Court of Kentucky took most
of the force out of this statute by holding that the act did not
forbid a certificate which contractually limited the insured's representative to a choice among nine undertakers named in the policy
and who were to be paid by the insurer. 1 1 In 1938 the Legislature
countered with a statute which forbade certificates providing for
payment to any single undertaker or list of undertakers. In the
case of Goodpaster v. Kenton & Campbell Benev. Burial Ass'n' 2
the Kentucky Court declared the 1938 statute unconstitutional as
a veiled attempt to abolish the burial insurance business. In the
course of the opinion, the Court said:
Had [protection against monopoly] been the actuating motive
it seems patent that the legislature would have approached the question from an entirely different angle. The monopoly feature could
be easily met, for example, by the simple process of requiring that
undertakers who gave the required security and agreement should
thereby become entitled to status as "official undertakers."103
The legislature, apparently seizing upon this quotation tried
once more and in 1944 provided that any undertaker who put up
security for the faithful performance of these contracts would be
permitted to perform them and again prohibited a listing of undertakers by contract between the association and its members. All
this was to no avail because in 1946 the legislature found that its
judgment on policy had been wrong all along:
We claim no perfection or sureness in reasoning, but after careful study and resolving all doubts we perceive no reasonable necessity or rational basis for saying that the Act is protective of the
members of the Association ....:o4
An Illinois act aimed at the conservation of natural resources
in land was invalidated in 1947 on the ground that the means were
not reasonably related to the end. The statute required the operator
of strip coal mines to level spoil ridges to approximately the original
contour upon completion of mining operations. The Illinois Supreme
Court 0 5 had no hesitation in substituting its judgment for that
101. Kenton & Campbell Benev. Burial Ass'n v. Quinn, 244 Ky.260,
50 S.W. 2d 554 (1932).
102. 279 Ky.92,129 S.W. 2d 1033 (1939).

103. Id. at 99, 129 S.W. 2d at 1036-37.

104. Kenton & Campbell Benev. Burial Ass'n v. Goodpaster, 304 Ky.
233, 200 S. W. 2d 120, 124 (1946).
105. Northern Illinois Coal Co. v. Medill, 397 Ill. 98, 72 N. E. 2d
844 (1947). All other courts which have recently passed on similar statutes
have upheld them. The cases are collected in a student note on the Medill
case, 23 Ind. L. J. 168 (1948).
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of the General Assembly as to the effectiveness of the law as a
conservation measure: "The method here employed does not bear
any reasonable relation to the object sought. . . ."106 For good
measure even if the enactment would create lands suitable for
farming, the Court added:
... the State has no authority, under the guise of a conservation
theory, to compel a private owner, at his own expense, to convert
07
his property to what it considers to be a higher or better use.
REGULATION OF LABOR UNIONS AND UNION PRACTICES

Substantive due process as it developed under the Fourteenth
Amendment was brought to full flower in labor cases. Lochner v.
New York.1c in 1905, invalidated an attempt by the state of New
York to regulate the hours of work for bakers and three years later
the Court upset a federal statute prohibiting discrimination by
employers against union members. 10 Coppage v.Kansas'" struck
down a state act which sought to abolish the yellow dog contract.
These statutes failed to meet the standards of the Fourteenth Amendment because liberty to contract had been unreasonably curtailed.
But the cases taught that the liberty guaranteed was that of the
employee as well as the employer. In an opinion holding a Kansas
compulsory arbitration law unconstitutional, Mr. Chief justice
Taft emphasized this point:
The penalties of the act are directed against effort of either side
to interfere with the settlement by arbitration. Without this joint
compulsion, the whole theory and purpose of the act would fail.
The State can not be heard to say, therefore, that upon complaint
of the employer, the effect upon the employee should not be a
factor in our judgment.""
During the New Deal period with its mass of reform labor
legislation, the Court revised its outlook. After West Coast Hotel
3
v. Parish2 ' and N. L. R. B. v. Jones-Laughlin,"1
the old limitations
upon legislation fixing wages and hours and encouraging unionization were swept away. "The course of decisions in this Court since
Adair v. The United States... and Coppage v. Kansas ...have
completely sapped those cases of their authority," said Mr. Justice
106. Id. at 105, 72 N. E. 2d at 847.
107. Ibid.
108. 198 U. S.45 (1905).
109. Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 (1908).
110. 236 U. S. 1 (1914).
111. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations of Kansas,
262 U. S. 522,541 (1923).
112. 300 U.S.379 (1937).
113. 301 U.S.1 (1937).
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Frankfurter in PhelpsDodge v. N. L. R. B. 114 Due process was no
longer a serious hurdle for legislation designed for labor's protection.
During and immediately after World War II, legislatures responded to a conviction that the New Deal had made labor and
its unions too powerful. The trend of legislation changed, with
numerous restrictions being imposed on unions and union practices.1 5 Faced with these enactments, labor's lawyers recalled the
pre-1937 Supreme Court cases and the emphasis in them upon
the constitutional liberties of employees. Labor's attack, therefore,
was grounded in part on Due Process. The effort has not met with
success in the Supreme Court"1 6 save in those cases where state
legislation has infringed the right of workers to freedom of expression.1 7 The judicial self-restraint developed in the area of business
regulation was equally applicable in the labor field:
[Labor] now [ask] us to return, at least in part, to the due
process philosophy that has been deliberately discarded. Claiming
that the Federal Constitution itself affords protection for union
members against discrimination, they nevertheless assert that the
same Constitution forbids a state from providing the same protection for non-union members. Just as we have held that the due
process clause erects no obstacle to block legislative protection of
union members, we now hold
that legislative protection can be
8
afforded non-union workers3.

In the light of what has occured in regard to state statutes regulating business, we may ask whether in the labor cases state courts
have ever drawn upon old federal material to void statutes under
state due process. Have the state courts used their state due process
clauses to protect union members against restrictive legislation from
which there is no longer an appeal to the Fourteenth Amendment?
Various attempts have been made to insure honesty and responsibility in the administration of unions. Information about the
union such as its constitution, by-laws, and financial status has to
be filed publicly under the terms of some statutes; others provide
for the licensing of union agents. The Alabama court has sustained
a state's power to require the filing of a union's constitution and
114. 313 U. S. 177,187 (1941).
115. Millis and Katz, A Decade of State Labor Legislation 1937-47,
15 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 282 (1948).
116. See Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & MAfetal
Co., 335 U. S. 525 (1949) ; A. F. of L. v. American Sash Co., 335 U. S.
538 (1949).
117. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940).
118. Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & fetal Co.,
335 U. S. 525, 537 (1949).
119. Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 18
So. 2d 810 (1944).
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by-laws.211 In addition Alabama has approved the compulsory filing

of union financial statements. 20 The Texas court,'' on the other
hand, invalidated the portion of its statute asking for unions'
financial statements, but in the same case upheld sections of the
statute which forced unions to list the names of its officers and
affiliations. The licensing of union agents was within legislative power according to the Texas 12- and Florida 123 courts. But
a California municipal ordinance of a similar sort was held unconstitutional there.'" The compulsory incorporation of unions, a
step advocated as a union responsibility measure, was held unconstitutional in Colorado.' 25 It should be noted, however, that the
Texas, California and Colorado courts felt bound by the federal
cases in invalidating their respective acts.
In a number of jurisdictions union security devices such as the
closed shop and the union shop either have been prohibited or their
use has been sharply restricted. Several states have adopted constitutional amendments which typically declare: "The right to work
shall not be denied or abridged because of membership or nonmembership in a union.'.

26

Where this is the case, of course, the

only due process question arises under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Representative of those cases in which a "right to work" statute has
been challenged under a state as well as the Federal Constitution is
the North Carolina case of State v. Whittaker.2

An employer and

employee were charged with entering into a closed shop contract
in violation of the act. On appeal from their conviction the defendants claimed the act unconstitutionally limited their freedom. Refusing to set aside the conviction, the North Carolina Supreme
Court asserted that due process was an "elastic term" which could
be expanded to meet the problems of the day. The reasonableness
of the regulation was attested by:
15 states . . .in which laws have been adopted prohibiting closed

shops.... Great weight must be attached to the fact that so many
separate jurisdictions have, within a short space of time, seen fit
to exercise their police power in the same manner. ....
12s
The Supreme Courts of Minnesota,'- Tennessee' 3" and Vir120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Ibid.
A.F. of L. v. Mann, 188 S. W. 2d 276 (Texas 1945).
Ibid.
Hill v. State ex rel. Watson, 155 Fla. 245, 19 So. 2d 857 (1944).
In re Porterfield, 28 Cal. 2d 91, 168 P. 2d 706 (1946).
A. F. of L. v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 90, 155 P. 2d 145 (1944).
E.g., Ark. Const. Amend. No. 34; Fla. Const. Decl. of Rights

§ 12 (as amended Nov. 7, 1944).

127. 228 N. C. 352, 45 S. E. 2d 860 (1947), aff'd, 335 U. S. 525 (1949).

128. Id. at 367, 45 S. E. 2d at 871.
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ginia 3'M have followed the Whittaker decision. The Virginia opinion is especially interesting because the court, in upholding the
anti-closed shop law, responds to values which are not unlike those
evidenced by the cases invalidating state business regulation:
the liberty so referred to [in the Virginia constitution] includes the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all
faculties and use them in all2 lawful ways ... and to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling.3

State statutes have placed limitations upon labor's right to
strike. In spite of the close connection between the right to strike
and the civil rights of workers, every state court which has considered the matter has refused to find that the restrictions im33
and New Jersey,', 4
posed violate due process. In Michigan
statutes providing for the compulsory arbitration of labor disputes
involving public utilities have been upheld in so far as they have
been challenged under due process clauses. The imposition of procedural requirements before a union may call a strike has been
sustained by the Minnesota Supreme Court. 35
Statutes regulating picketing are very common and many of
the acts have been upheld by state courts. Where they have been
held unconstitutional, the Thornhill case"3 -- a United States Supreme Court opinion-was deemed controlling by the state court. 37
In summary, no state case has held unconstitutional either an
anti-closed shop statute or a measure imposing limitations on the
right to strike. The state courts, it is true, have upset some of the
union control legislation and some of the anti-picketing statutes.
But there is one great difference between these latter cases and
129. Dayton Co. v. Carpet, Linoleum and Decorators' Union, 39 N. W.
2d 183 (Minn. 1949).
130. Mascari v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 215 S. W.
2d 779 (Tenn. 1948).
131.

Finney v. Hawkins, 54 S. E. 2d 872 (Va. 1949).

132. Id. at 875.

133. Local 170 v. Gadola, 322 Mich. 332, 34 N. W. 2d 71 (1948).
Hovever, the statute was held invalid because it provided for the imposition of non-judicial duties on certain judges.
134. State v. Traffic Telephone Workers Federation, 66 A. 2d 616
(NJ. 1949). Although the statute survived constitutional attack under due
process, it was invalid because adequate standards were not set up to guide
the arbitration board in making awards.
135. Dayton Co. v. Carpet, Linoleum and Decorators' Union, 39 N. W.
2d 183 (Minn. 1949). An inferior court in Michigan upheld a similar Michigan act: Michigan v. XVoodcook, 16 Labor Cases ff 65,019 (Cir. Ct. Mich.
1949).
136. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940).
137. E.g., Ex Parte Hun, 357 Mo. 256, 207 S. W. 2d 468 (1948);
Int'l Union of Operating Engineers v. Cox, 219 S. W. 2d 787 (Texas,
1949).
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those in which business regulatory measures have been voided. The
labor cases have been grounded on the Fourteenth Amendment as
well as the state constitutions. In no case has a state court invalidated a statute solely on state due process grounds.
CONCLUSION

The state cases involving regulation of business show the economic, political and social judgments of judges being made part
of the constitutional fabric wherever legislation is invalidated on
due process grounds. The ideals which these state courts value are
those of Nineteenth Century Liberalism. In the labor cases there
is no evidence that any court would shield unions beyond the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the southern states generally, and in Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania where substantive
due process is very much alive, judges have frequently set up almost
insurmountable barriers to government's attempt to deal with important public problems. The Hertz Drivurself case plainly created
a serious impediment to the construction of an integrated pattern
of public motor transportation in Pennsylvania. Without control
of vehicle lessors, the regulated carriers may eventually be subject
to the kind of competitive pressure which will undermine the whole
scheme of public motor transportation. 3 s It is difficult to see what
more the legislature of Kentucky can do to deal with the abusive business practices of burial insurance corporations. In Illinois the cause
of conservation of natural resources has been seriously hampered
because of judicial interference with legislative judgment.
A single thread has run through a great many of the cases.
In some states the judiciary is reluctant to sit idly by while minority
groups capture the machinery of the state in order to secure a
monopoly position. Given the short legislative session in many states
and the concentrated attention which pressure groups may devote
to that session, one may well sympathize with that point of view.
Indeed, some of the liberal members of the United States Supreme
Court have apparently been willing to use the Fourteenth Amendment as some small degree of protection against this monopoly by
minority. These Supreme Court liberals differ in technique from
some of their brethren on the state bench in that they would employ the Equal Protection Clause rather than Due Process. During
138. The problems raised by the Hertz case are discussed in Nutting

and Kuhn, Motor Carrier Regulation-the Third Phase, 10 U. of Pitt. L.

Rev. 477 (1949).
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the most recent term of Court, Mr. Justice Douglas as well as the
late Justices Murphy and Rutledge dissented from an opinion upholding a statute which would eliminate most women as barmaids
in Michigan. 139 In 1947, the same justices joined by Mr. Justice
Reed, dissented in a case which upheld Louisiana's power to license
only those river pilots who were connected with the vocation by
reason of blood relationship to already licensed pilots.140 In the dissent, Mr. Justice Rutledge said:
The door is thereby closed to all not having blood relationship to
presently licensed pilots. Whether the occupation is considered as
having the status of "public officer" or of highly regulated private
employment, it is beyond 1legislative
power to make entrance to it
41
turn upon such a criterion.

Granted that the state-enforced economic power of small groups
is undesirable, what is the remedy? Is it not to make legislatures
more responsive to the public welfare? Is not judicial interference
merely an encouragement to legislative irresponsibility? Although
his language seems inconsistent with his vote in both the barmaids
case and the river pilots case, the late Mr. Justice Murphy has made
answer to these questions:
Looking through the form of this plea to its essential basis, we
cannot fail to recognize it as an argument for invalidity because this
Court disagrees with the desirability of the legislation. We rehearse
the obvious when we say that our function is thus misconceived. We
are not equipped to decide desirability; and a court cannot eliminate
measures which do not happen
to suit its tastes if it seeks to main42
tain a democrative system.'
139. Gbesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464 (1948).
140. Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Com'rs of New Orleans, 330
U. S. 552 (1947).
141. Id. at 565.
142. Daniel v. Family Security Life Insurance Co., 336 U. S. 220,
224 (1949).

